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ABSTRACT 
 
Which Institutions Encourage Entrepreneurs to Create 
Larger Firms?* 
 
We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types of 
entrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates 
hypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights 
and especially intellectual property rights, and a larger state on entrepreneurs who plan to 
grow faster. We test these hypotheses using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys in 
55 countries for 2001-2006, applying a multilevel estimation framework. We confirm our main 
hypotheses but we find no significant impact from intellectual property rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Entrepreneurship is a multi-faceted activity, with a variety of definitions and 
interpretations (Parker 2009). For some researchers, the key characteristic of entrepreneurs is 
their ability to innovate and create new and large scale business ventures (Acs and Audretsch 
1990). Others contrast entrepreneurship with paid employment, and analyse the former as a 
labour market choice to become self-employed (Evans and Leighton 1989). In practice, the 
evidence suggest that entrepreneurship covers a multitude of activities from large scale new 
firm creation via developing new business models within existing firms to more flexible 
employment relationships for a single individual through self-employment. While an 
enormous amount of theoretical and empirical work analyses the determinants of 
entrepreneurship, there has been inadequate recognition that these determining characteristics 
may vary according to what type of entrepreneur is being considered. Thus, some of the 
factors conducive to the formation of micro-enterprises might be fundamentally different to 
those underpinning innovative new venture creation which plan to grow to a significant scale. 
This may also have important implications for business policy to support entrepreneurship. 
This argument is likely to have particular force when we refer to the institutional context 
supporting entrepreneurial activity across countries. Since Baumol (1990, 1993), a literature 
has emerged suggesting that entrepreneurial activity will vary by country according to the 
quality of supporting institutions. Institutional theory has argued that company behaviour, 
including entrepreneurial choices, will be context specific (Meyer and Peng 2005), and a 
literature has emerged to show that entrepreneurial activity is sensitive to the quality of 
institutions (Batjargal 2003; Sobel 2008) as well as to the level of development. Within this 
context, entrepreneurship, and especially entrepreneurial aspirations, are both seen as elements 
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in the process of autonomous experimentation leading to innovations and fuelling economic 
progress (Ricketts, 2006). Important theoretical developments of these notions include 
Busenitz, Gomez and Spencer (2000) while Aidis et al.(2010) establish empirically the central 
role of corruption, the quality of property rights and the size of the state sector in explaining 
the variation in rates of entrepreneurial entry across countries. Our approach in this paper is to 
explore whether the plans of entrepreneurs to create jobs are influenced by the institutional 
characteristics of the countries where they live.  Our framework generates hypotheses on the 
institutional factors influencing the expected size of new entrepreneurial firms at time of the 
start-up, in terms of the aspirations to generate employment five years hence. We test these 
hypotheses using a large scale cross-country cross-individual dataset containing 13,336 
observations on entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations comprising 55 countries1
We go on to establish empirically that the proposed aspects of the institutional context 
do affect the employment growth plans of entrepreneurs. Controlling for the level of 
development and numerous individual characteristics, we show that less corruption and better 
protection of property rights enhance the growth plans of entrepreneurs. In turn, governance 
and allocative disincentives indicated by the size of the government are shown to have a 
 (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2001-2006) combined with a number of institutional 
datasets. Taking into account the hierarchical structure of the data, we employ multilevel 
modelling with individuals representing level one and countries or country-years representing 
level two. We also address the problem of potential selection bias which might arise from the 
interdependence between individual’s choice of whether to become an entrepreneur and 
his/her growth aspirations, by utilizinga Heckman selection framework. 
                                                 
1 The 2001-2006 GEM dataset includes the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, South 
Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, UK, 
United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.   
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negative and significant effect on entrepreneurial employment aspirations. However, though 
the literature has suggested that intellectual property rights may also be important for 
entrepreneurship, we find no evidence that they count for employment growth.  
These findings have important implications for entrepreneurs and policy-makers. We 
place the aspirations by entrepreneurs to create more jobs in the spotlight, because raising 
employment is important for its own sake and dynamic new ventures are strongly correlated 
with innovation, technological change and investment. Entrepreneurs planning to build 
relatively large scale businesses are advised to look closely at both levels of corruption and the 
property rights environment. If possible, they should choose to locate where the quality of the 
property rights system is higher and corruption less widespread. Policy-makers seeking to 
encourage high-aspiration entrepreneurship in order to stimulate innovation, employment and 
growth in the economy as a whole should focus above all else on containing the levels of 
corruption and improving the quality of the basic property rights systems and on contract 
enforcement, rather than a narrower focus on intellectual property rights. 
The existing literature is largely silent on the question of how entrepreneur’s job growth 
aspirations might be determined and almost none of existing papers address the question 
across institutional contexts. Autio (2005, 2007) provides insights about regional patterns of 
high-growth aspiration entrepreneurial activity, its associations with the national 
entrepreneurial environment, and individual characteristics of high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurs, but does not offer testable implications regarding their determinants. There are 
however two relevant recent contributions in the literature: Bowen and De Clercq (2008), who 
analyse the impact of the institutional environment on the allocation of entrepreneurial effort 
toward high-growth activities using aggregate data, and  Autio and Acs (2010), who similarly 
to us apply a multilevel framework, but focus on a single institutional dimension, namely 
intellectual property rights. We provide a more general theoretical and empirical framework 
and focus on planned employment growth rates rather than the number of jobs which 
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entrepreneurs aspire to create. This difference is important because expected employment does 
not accurately measure employment growth aspirations. This is because even in a business 
classified on the basis of the expected level of future employment as a high-growth aspiration 
venture, the employment growth rate may become zero or even negative when we take 
account of the current level of employment. The errors introduced by failing to control for the 
initial level of employment are not trivial; out of all new entrepreneurs who expect to employ 
other people in five years time, 28.5% have their expected employment equal to their current 
level of employment.  
We make original contribution in three main areas. Our conceptual work based on 
institutional theory by North (1990), Baumol (1990) and Williamson (2000) develops a 
framework to analyse the role of the national institutional context on types of 
entrepreneurship, differentiated according to employment growth aspirations. We propose 
three specific hypotheses concerning the impact of corruption, strength of property rights and 
the size of the state on planned employment growth. Further, we address the statistical issues 
arising from the joint determination of entrepreneurship and of growth aspirations and 
resulting from the fact that the dataset has a hierarchical structure. We address the first by 
using Heckman’s methodology to verify whether selection models are appropriate to take 
account of potential interdependences, and the second by the use of multilevel modelling. 
Finally, based on theory, our empirical results indicate which institutions influence 
entrepreneurial employment growth aspirations. The negative impact of corruption is 
highlighted, as is the general benefit of sound property, but not intellectual property rights.  
Larger state sectors have a generally demotivating effect on job creation by entrepreneurs.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops institutional theory to identify 
the institutional factors likely to influence entrepreneurs’ employment growth aspirations.  It 
concludes with the three hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and the 
methodology, including the individual and macro level control variables such as the level of 
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development (GDP per capita) to be used in the empirical analysis. Empirical results and 
discussion follow in Section 4, and Section 5 presents conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH ASPIRATIONS OF ENTREPRENEURS; THEORY 
AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This paper analyses the ways in which a number of key institutional dimensions might 
influence entrepreneurial aspirations. Since Douglass North’s definitive analysis (1990), it has 
been understood that many of the incentives underlying rational behaviour which economists 
regard as too obvious to discuss with reference to developed market economies in fact rely on 
the quality of institutions in the country under analysis. Entrepreneurial organisations, like all 
others, will adapt their strategies to fit the opportunities and limitations defined by the 
institutional framework in which they operate. Baumol argues that the quality of institutions 
affects the allocation of entrepreneurial effort between alternative activities, e.g. productive or 
non-productive (Baumol 1993, 2005). More generally, the literature has established that a 
well-functioning business environment provides positive incentives for entrepreneurs while a 
weak institutional environment is likely to be deleterious (North 1990, 1994: Baumol 1993; 
Davidsson and Henrekson 2002; Harper 2003; Aidis et al. 2010). For example, strong property 
rights are a crucial ingredient in the development of efficient capital markets, and therefore the 
flow of funds to entrepreneurs. Similarly, it has been understood that the establishment and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights for inventors of new products and processes will 
stimulate the flow of innovation.As a third example, one can cite the argument that corruption 
will impact disproportionately on entrepreneurs relative to existing organisations because it is 
more difficult for them to evaluate the likely future scale and frequency of demands on their 
income stream (Aidis and Mickiewicz, 2006). From the sociological perspective, Busenitz, 
Gomez and Spencer (2000) highlight that variation in formal institutions also has deep social 
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and cultural roots, which influence the social desirability of entrepreneurial activity. Bowen 
and de Clerq (2008) develop a framework building on Whitley (1991) who proposes that the 
institutional context influences national business systems, and goes on to suggest  particular 
institutions likely to affect the behaviour of entrepreneurs. However, their list of critical 
institutions is ad hoc, largely derived from their predicted effects on entrepreneurs rather than 
from institutional theory and in particular does not take account of key distinctions, for 
example concerning the exogeneity of institutions and differences in their speed of change, 
which are particularly important when using data which have a time dimension.  
Addressing these concerns, in our work, we build on the frameworks of North (1990), 
Williamson (2000) and Aidis et al. (2010). North introduces a critical distinction: between 
formalinstitutions, namely the “rules of the game” comprising the laws and formal institutional 
structures that define the economic incentives guiding individual and organisational choices 
and strategies, and informal institutions that comprise the social arrangements, networks and 
loosely knit structures that explain how many of these incentives are either enhanced or muted 
by the actual operations of institutions. Estrin and Prevezer (2011) analyse how formal and 
informal institutions interact either to encourage or to disincentivise entrepreneurial activity. 
Formal institutions are clearly of great relevance to entrepreneurship, and of these perhaps the 
most important is the property rights system which underlies the operation of a market 
economy. However, the literature also places great emphasis on informal institutions, for 
example on the role of social networks in supporting early entrepreneurial activity and in 
substituting for weak or deficient formal institutions. 
Williamson (2000) places further structure on the analysis with the proposition that 
institutions can be considered in terms of a hierarchy comprising four levels, each placing 
constraints on the levels below. He places informal institution, denoted social embeddedness, 
at the top of the hierarchy because these are the deepest rooted and the slowest changing. 
When considering the variation of entrepreneurship across countries, Baumol (1990) might 
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argue that the most important example of such an institution is represented by the levels of 
individual, legal and administrative probity. Corruption is an important indicator of this norm 
and can therefore be viewed in Williamson’s sense as embedded (McMillan and Woodruff 
2002; Aidis et al. 2010). At the second level are the constitutional foundations of the formal 
institutional environment. As Williamson notes (p. 598), here “the definition and the 
enforcement of property rights and the enforcement of contract law are important features”, 
and this is especially so for entrepreneurs who need to rely on the enforceability of their 
claims as residual claimant to the returns from the organisations that they have created 
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Johnson et al 1999, 2000; Hodler 2009). The third level is 
governance, and is concerned with shaping the way in which the individuals interact with each 
other in practice. The key areas in the depth and quality of governance that are of relevance to 
entrepreneurship include regulation of incumbent firms to prevent anti-competitive behaviour 
that might restrict the activities of entrepreneurs and the barriers to entry (Djankov et al. 
2002). Generally, the dimensions of governance relate to the scale and effectiveness of the 
state apparatus. Finally, at the fourth level, Williamson (2000) considers resource allocation 
and employment, and the traditional economist’s analysis of prices, quantities and incentives.  
From the entrepreneurship perspective, the main way that this will influence individual 
choices is via opportunity costs and rewards from entrepreneurship as against alternative 
forms of employment (Parker 2009). 
In their study of institutions and entrepreneurship, Aidis et al. (2010) develop hypotheses 
concerning all four levels in the hierarchy, namely informal institutions (corruption), formal 
institutions (property rights), governance  and resource allocation; with the latter two 
combined into a single indicator as the size of the government. They also highlight the critical 
role of the level of development, indicated by for example by GDP per capita, in moderating 
some of these effects. It is well known that levels of entrepreneurial activity decline with level 
of development up to a point, and then rise, as innovative activity plays an increasingly 
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important role in the growth process (Wennekers et al 2005). However, this relationship 
depends on various aspects of institutions. For example, individuals in poor countries choose 
entrepreneurship or self-employment rather than taking paid work because the opportunities 
for work are relatively few and so the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship is low. However, 
the returns to entrepreneurship will be reduced when corruption is high, property rights are 
weak or entry regulations are burdensome. Similarly, formal property rights may tend to be 
stronger in more developed economies but considerable variation remains presentthat could 
lead to differences in entrepreneurship rates(e.g.France is characterised by weaker protection 
of property rights than Germany(Heritage Foundation)). 
 The work cited above addressed the question of how the institutional context affects the 
decision by individuals as to whether to become an entrepreneur rather than to choose paid 
employment or not to be involved in the labour force. Our analysis in this paper will instead 
focus on differences between entrepreneurs. It will apply the Williamson’s (2000) framework 
and build on previous findings to explain the impact of different institutions on employment 
growth aspirations.  This is the element of entrepreneurship of particular relevance for 
business policy and company strategy because entrepreneurs that intend to grow rapidly are 
also likely to be the ones that are bringing new products to markets or developing new 
business models or production processes.  In the discussion that follows we therefore propose 
ways that the key institutions identified in the literature as influencing the entrepreneurial 
entry decision might also influence the employment growth aspirations of those entrepreneurs, 
addressing each of the levels of Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy in turn.  
We focus on the institutional dimensions that the literature has regarded as crucial in 
determining entrepreneurship, namely, corruption, the protection and enforcement of property 
rights and the size of the state sector. Both freedom from corruption and property rights 
provide the basis for voluntary exchange and the market economy and have been identified 
empirically as a critical determinant of entrepreneurial activity (Djankov et al 2002; McMillan 
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and Woodruff 2002; Aidis et al. 2010). The size of the state sector impacts on 
entrepreneurship via the returns to entrepreneurial activity and the opportunity cost of 
alternative employment choices (Parker 2004, 2009; Henrekson, 2005; Aidis et al. 2010). We 
discuss these aspects in turn below. 
 
2.1Corruption 
It has been argued that corruption is damaging to new firm entry, by raising the costs and 
therefore reducing the returns to entrepreneurial activity (Anokhin and Schulze 2009). It 
makes the economic environment highly uncertain (Choi and Thum 2005), in a manner that 
impacts relatively more on potential new firms than incumbents, who have developed 
experience of operating in a corrupt environment and operate via an established set of social 
networks to limit the scale and impact of corrupt practices in their businesses (Aidis et al. 
2008a; 2010). New firms need to develop experience and contacts, and in the interim therefore 
operate at a disadvantage to existing enterprises, which further reduces the returns to 
entrepreneurship. Baumol (1990) argued that entrepreneurship is an activity that could take 
productive, non-productive or destructive forms according to the institutional environment in 
which entrepreneurs operated. Desai and Acs (2007) suggest that destructive entrepreneurship 
is probably best understood through the concept of rent seeking; “any redistributive activity 
that takes up resources” (p.5). They cite Murphy et al. (1993) who explore the trade-off 
between entrepreneurship (and innovation) and rent seeking (redistributing existing wealth, 
often through corrupt practises); they find that the latter is rewarded more highly than the 
former in many institutional contexts. The corresponding hypothesis related to the link 
between environments that have higher levels of corruption and the lower likelihood of 
entrepreneurial entry is tested using the GEM dataset by Aidis et al (2010). They confirm the 
hypothesis and note implicit supporting evidence for the view that corruption is a higher order 
(embeddedness level) institution because the phenomenon is very slow to change.  
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The effects of a corrupt institutional environment seem likely to be particularly pernicious 
when we consider higher growth aspiration entrepreneurship. As noted above, corruption will 
reduce the returns to all types of entrepreneurship. However, it seems likely that very small 
scale enterprises and self-employed workers can largely fly below the radar screens of corrupt 
officials, in a manner that would not be possible for new firms which have a larger economic 
footprint. Moreover, as noted by Desai and Acs (2007), a corrupt environment may have 
negative supply side effects on entrepreneurs, and especially on those with higher aspirations, 
leading them to satisfy their ambitions through rent seeking rather than the formation of new 
firms. In the light of this we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of corruption will reduce the employment growth aspirations of 
entrepreneurs.  
 
2.2 Protection of property rights 
Recent theories of entrepreneurship emphasise that “the institution of private property ... 
has an important psychological dimension that enhances our feelings of ... internal control and 
personal agency, and it thereby promotes entrepreneurial alertness” (Harper 2003, p. 74). It is 
important that property rights not only guarantee the status quo, but also have the ‘find and 
keep’ component, which is essential for entrepreneurial activities, related to discovery, 
innovation and the creation of new resources (Harper 2003). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
show that property rights have pronounced effects on investment, financial development and 
long-run economic growth. In their empirical account, Aidis et al. (2010) find the property 
rights system to play the pivotal role in determining entrepreneurial entry, in particular in low 
and middle income countries. Johnson et al. (2002) also provide evidence that weak property 
rights discourage entrepreneurs from reinvesting profits. 
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However the literature has not investigated whether property rights will have a differential 
effect with respect to entrepreneurs’ plans for employment growth. The significance of 
property rights is related to the opportunity for the entrepreneur to utilise the resources of 
others via secure contracts. For example high-growth aspiration projects are likely to be more 
dependent on external finance. Moreover, because the assets that entrepreneurs rely upon are 
often liquid, they may be easier to expropriate. In contrast, less sophisticated and less contract-
intensive forms of entrepreneurship such as simple one-person businesses will be less sensitive 
to the quality of protection of property rights. Lower aspiration forms of entrepreneurship may 
instead rely on localised trust that can partially substitute for a deficient formal institutional 
environment (Aidis et al 2008a). Arrangements of this kind are commonplace in many 
developing countries (De Soto, 1989; 2000). Therefore high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship may be more sensitive to institutional quality. 
Hence, the first part of our second hypothesis is formulated in general terms as: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Stronger property rights with respect to contract enforcement will encourage 
higher employment growth aspiration entrepreneurship. 
 
Bowen and de Clerq (2008) among others have argued that intellectual property rights 
form the most important component of property rights, relevant for higher employment growth 
aspiration entrepreneurs. This is because they are likely to be basing their decision to enter a 
market upon an innovation of product or process, and they are therefore especially exposed to 
imitation or theft of their ideas. The intellectual property rights framework is therefore the 
element of Williamson’s (2000) second level of institutional hierarchy that they chose to stress 
in analysing the impact of property rights on higher employment growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship. This provides an alternative to hypothesis 2a namely, 
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Hypothesis 2b: Stronger property rights with respect to intellectual property will encourage 
higher employment growth aspiration entrepreneurship. 
 
2.3Size of the government 
Aidis et al. (2010) showed that the third level of Williamson’s hierarchy as applied to 
entrepreneurship could be combined as a single variable, indicating the size of the government 
sector. A large state sector is usually synonymous with generous levels of welfare provision, 
for example unemployment benefits, pensions and child welfare for women in work. These 
benefits must be paid for, and this is usually done by high levels of personal taxation, often 
within a progressive tax regime in which high earners, such as successful entrepreneurs, pay 
higher marginal rates.  This will reduce the expected returns to entrepreneurial activity. 
Moreover, when the welfare system for those in employment is generous, the opportunity cost 
of entrepreneurship as against other forms of employment or non-participation in the labor 
force is raised. Taken together, these factors would suggest that a larger state sector will 
reduce entrepreneurial activity; a hypothesis confirmed by Aidis et al. (2010). 
In this context, we may also consider the impact on higher employment growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship. If a larger state sector is financed by higher levels of average and marginal 
taxation, this is likely to deter high growth entrepreneurship more by reducing the  net returns 
to entrepreneurship (Carroll et al. 2000).  
Accordingly we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A greater scale of government economic activity will reduce the employment 
growth aspirations of entrepreneurs.  
15 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Individual Data 
To test our hypotheses we merge GEM data with a country-level institutional indicators 
and macroeconomic controls. We utilize data collected through the GEM adult population 
surveys in 2001-2006 that cover 55 countries worldwide. With very few exceptions, the data 
consist of representative samples of at least 2,000 individuals in each country. The samples are 
drawn from the working age population which avoids the potential selectivity bias that could 
affect studies which focus on existing entrepreneurs. GEM surveys were completed through 
phone calls and through face-to-face interviews in countries, where low density of the 
telephone network could create a bias. National datasets are harmonised across all countries 
included in the survey2
The GEM data capture a wide range of business creation activities. We can distinguish 
between (a) individuals who intend to create a new venture, (b) who are in the process of 
establishing a new firm (start-ups, or nascent entrepreneurs)
. 
3
                                                 
2 For more details of the sampling procedure see Reynolds et al. (2005, 2008). 
3 Start-ups or nascent entrepreneurs are defined in GEM as individuals between 18-64 years old, showing some 
action towards setting up a new business whether fully or partly owned. They also must not yet have paid any 
wages or salaries for more than three months. 
, (c) currently operating young 
firms (under 3.5 years), and (d) other owners-managers of established businesses. We 
concentrate on young firms as our proxy for entrepreneurial entry. This category serves well 
the purpose of our study as, unlike the nascent entrepreneurship category, it provides good 
coverage of the current level of employment, used for defining our dependent variable (see 
subsection 3.3). It is hard for start-ups to respond to questions concerning the current level of 
employment given the early stage of their venture, for example, writing a business plan. Thus 
in our dataset, only 8% of the sample start-ups report the level of employment as against 83% 
for young firms. 
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3.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable, the employment growth aspirations (EGA as listed in the equation 
1, presented in section 3.5 below) of owners-managers of new firms (entrepreneurs), is 
calculated as the expected percentage change in the level of employment in five years from the 
current level. Following the existing practice (Parker 2009), we add the owner-manager to the 
expected and current employees to calculate both the expected and the current employment 
correspondingly. The rate of employment growth reflecting entrepreneurial aspirations is 
measured by the difference between the natural logarithms of expected and current 
employment. Previous studies utilizing GEM data (Bowen andDeClercq 2008; Autio and Acs 
2010) focus on expected employment alone4, which we do not consider as an accurate 
measure of growth expectations. This is because, when we take account of the current level of 
employment, we find that the employment growth rate may become zero or even negative, 
even in a business classified on the basis of the expected level of future employment as a high-
growth aspiration venture. In our sample, out of all new entrepreneurs who expect to employ 
other people in five years time, 28.5% have their expected employment equal to their current 
level of employment, which indicates a true expectation of zero growth5
Figure 1 show country-level differences in new businesses’ employment growth 
aspirations with 95% confidence intervals. These were calculated from a random-intercept 
model that included only country effects. The average employment growth aspirations of new 
owners-managers vary from as low as 11% in Greece to as high as 75% in Colombia (with 
. Accordingly, in this 
study we utilize the expected rate of employment growth by new firms to capture 
entrepreneurial aspirations.  
                                                 
4 The question is worded, ‘How many people will be working for this business, not counting the owners but 
including all exclusive subcontractors, when it is five years old?’ which does not capture net employment 
creation.  
5 There are also cases when new entrepreneurs expect to employ people five years hence, but the expected rate of 
employment growth is actually negative (4.5%). 
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Chile and Peru scoring close behind)6
For the strength of property rights (Hypothesis 2a), no universally accepted set of 
measures yet exists
.  Countries with predicted residuals above the horizontal 
line at zero have mean employment growth expectations higher than all countries’ average 
(44%).    
{Figure 1} 
3.3 Cross Country Data; variables related to our main hypotheses 
To test Hypothesis 1, we use the Heritage Foundation Index of ‘Freedom from 
Corruption’ to measure the level of corruption, inversely (l.FreeCorr:  the operator l,is added 
to denote that a variable is lagged one year). This indicator shows the perception of corruption 
in the business environment, including levels of governmental administrative, judicial and 
legal corruption (Beach and Kane 2008). It ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 denoting the lowest 
levels of corruption. 
7
                                                 
6 These mean scores for countries are calculated on the basis of random intercepts, while confidence intervals are 
based on empirical Bayesian predictions. 
,  though many scholars have relied on the Heritage Foundation–Wall 
Street Journal index of quality of  property rights (e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Aidis et 
al 2010; Autio and Acs 2010).  However, the Heritage Foundation variable integrates two 
dimensions of property rights, namely protection from arbitrary government and protection of 
private contracts and given our theoretical framework we follow Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005) in believing the former to be more important, especially for entrepreneurship. We 
therefore use as our main measure of strength of property rights the Polity IV measure of 
7These include indicators provided by the International Country Risk Guide (especially law and order and 
investment profile measures; see: http://www.prsgroup.com/), the World Bank measures of governance 
effectiveness (especially, the rule of law indicator; see: Kaufmann et al, 2009); the World Bank’s Doing Business 
indicators (especially, those related to enforcing contracts; see: World Bank, 2009); the Frazer Institute indices 
(especially: legal structure and security of property rights indicator; see: Gwartneyet al, 2008) and the Heritage 
Foundation / Wall Street Journal indices (especially: property rights; see: Beach and Kane, 2008). In addition, 
given that the protection of property rights is conditional on the more fundamental feature of lack of arbitrariness 
in government actions, one may rely directly on measures of constraints on executive branch of the government 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2007; for application, see: Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). All these indicators are highly 
correlated, especially as underlying source information comes from the limited number of sources (see: 
Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). 
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efficient constraints on the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government, dubbed 
as “constraints on executive” (l.ExecConstr). 
Our measure of the strength of intellectual property rights (Hypothesis 2b) is based on the 
executive survey conducted by World Economic Forum. It is scored as a continuous variable 
from 1, denoting weak protection, to 7, representing the world’s most stringent level of 
protection (l.IntelPro). Finally to measure the size of the state (Hypothesis 3), we use the 
Heritage Foundation measure, which is based on the quadratic transformation of the ratio of 
government expense to GDP, with lower scores signifying a larger government (l.GovSize). 
 
3.4 Control Variables 
We follow Aidis et al. (2010) in controlling for the level of development by using  per 
capita GDP at purchasing power parity (l.GDPpc) as well as the GDP annual growth rate 
(obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators) for cyclical effects 
(l.GDPgrowth).   
Commencing with macro-level variables, we follow Bowen and De Clercq (2008) in 
controlling for FDI (foreign direct investment) (l.FDI). Prior research identifies various 
indirect transmission mechanisms including technological externalities, backward and forward 
linkages and competition (Damijan et al 2003; Navaretti and Venables 2004; Javorcik 2004). 
Entrepreneurship, especially of the high-growth aspiration type, may serve as a mechanism 
through which a new idea or technologies from foreign subsidiaries may spill over to domestic 
companies (Audretsch and Thurik 2004, Cohen and Levinthal 1989). FDI may increase 
competition, affecting both the market position of domestic incumbent firms and discouraging 
the entry of new start-ups (De Backer and Sleuwaegen 2003; Bowen andDeClercq 2008). We 
use UNCTAD datafor the share of FDI in GDP. 
Given the multilevel nature of our data it is also important to control for the individual 
characteristics of entrepreneurs (Parker 2009). In particular, business networks have been 
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found to play an important role via social learning using role models (Minniti et al. 2005b) in 
assisting entrepreneurs to find the resources required for business creation (Aldrich et al 1987; 
Djankov 2006; Nanda and Sorensen 2007; Aidis et al 2008a; 2008b). Network capital also 
facilitates entrepreneurs’ access to finance (Aldrich et al 1987, Johannisson 2000) and is often 
regarded as an intangible asset that can be used to overcome difficulties arising from failure of 
formal institutions (Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011). We control for this by using the response to 
a GEM question about whether the individual knows an entrepreneur personally 
(KnowsEntrep) and also introduce a dummy variable denoting individual experience of being 
a business angel (BusAngel) which is expected to be positively associated with entrepreneurs’ 
expectations of employment growth. 
Previous entrepreneurial experience is argued to make subsequent entry more likely by 
enhancing self-efficacy, both through “direct mastery experience (learning by doing) and 
vicarious experience (learning by seeing)” (Harper 2003, p. 46). However, owning another 
existing business (EstabBus) may raise the opportunity cost of a new involvement, 
discouraging serial entrepreneurship. 
A number of scholars have articulated the influence of risk aversion on the individual 
decision to become an entrepreneur (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979; Cramer et al. 2002). The 
conventional wisdom is that individuals with lower risk aversion are more likely to become 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity. Both Arenius and Minniti (2005) and Ardagna and Lusardi 
(2008) find that an increased fear of failure, associated with higher risk aversion, discourages 
nascent entrepreneurial activity. We control for this by using a GEM question about whether 
the fear of failure would prevent the individual from starting a business (FearFail). 
Previous GEM-based research shows that individuals with higher educational attainment 
are more likely to start a business (Minniti et al 2005b) and to direct their efforts towards high-
growth activities (Autio 2005). We use two variables to control for education, concerning 
secondary (EducSecpost) and tertiary education (EducPost) respectively. In addition, middle-
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aged persons are more likely to start a business (Reynolds et al 1999; Minniti et al 2005b) and 
we control for a quadratic in the age of the individual (Age, AgeSq). Entrepreneurial activity is 
found to vary significantly with gender: being a male is more likely to drive up the rates of 
entrepreneurship (Minnitiet al 2005a; Grilo and Thurik, 2005) so we include a dummy 
variable for gender (Male). Individuals who are currently employed also found to be more 
likely to become entrepreneurs (Minnitiet al 2005a), so we include a dummy variable for 
employment status (CurrEmp). 
Finally, we control for the current level of employment of young ventures in our sample, 
expecting the higher initial level of employment to be negatively related to employment 
growth plans of entrepreneurs (lnEmployment). 
Definitions of variables discussed above are reported in Table 1 below. 
{Table 1} 
3.5 Methodology 
We follow Autio and  Acs (2010) in using multilevel modelling to address the issues of 
unobserved heterogeneity within the context of a cross-country, cross-time, cross-individual 
dataset. Multilevel modelling takes account of the fact that our dataset has a hierarchical 
structure in which individuals represent level one and country-years samples represent level 
two. This allows us to control for clustering of the data within a country or country-year. 
Failure to do this would lead to biased results. Specifically, clustering may give rise to the 
problem of unit dependencies, where, for example, two entrepreneurs from the same country 
in the same year are more likely to exhibit similar patterns in their behaviour whether this 
concerns growth aspirations or any other strategic choice. In this case, the independence 
assumption does not hold, and a multi-level, random effects model should be employed to 
obtain the correct standard errors (Rabe-Heskethet al. 2005).  We utilise more sample 
information by choosing country-years rather than countries for our level two groupings to 
take account of differences in samples collected in different years, where applicable.  
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We examined if the choice of multilevel modelling with country-year effects is justified on 
this dataset: we tested the significance of country-year group effects (random intercepts) by 
performing a likelihood ratio test which compares the multilevel model with a single-level 
model8
ijntInEmployme
. We found that country-group effects are significant for models of entrepreneurial 
employment growth aspirations, thus confirming the choice of methodology.  We further 
tested the appropriateness of utilizing a random intercept versus a random slope model where 
in the first instance we allow only for intercept to vary randomly across country-year groups 
while in the second we allow for both the intercept and the slope to vary randomly across 
country-year groups. In testing for random slopes, we used a likelihood ratio (LR) test 
comparing a pair of a random-intercept model with a random-slope model for each individual-
level variable. The results of LR tests (available upon request from the authors) suggest that a 
random intercept model is preferred. 
In addition to individual effects (subscript ij below) we also introduced country-year 
averages (subscript j below), distinguishing between individual level and group level variation, 
so that for instance coefficient β5 for represents an individual effect of being in 
employment, and coefficient β16 for jntInEmployme represents a peer effect of employment 
prevalence rate in a given country-year group that may affect the individual entrepreneurial 
decision. By using the LP test we verified that the inclusion of peer effects was needed.  
Our regression model is therefore specified as follows: 
ijjjjj
jjjj
jjjjj
jjjjjij
ijijijijij
ijijijijijij
uGDPpclGDPgrowthlFDIl
IntelprolFreeCorrlExecConstrlGovSizelFearFail
pKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBusEducPosttEducSecpos
ntInEmploymeMaleAgeSqAgeCurrEmpFearFail
pKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBusEducPosttEducSecpos
ntInEmploymeMaleAgeSqAgeCurrEmpEGA
εβββ
βββββ
βββββ
ββββββ
βββββ
ββββββ
+++++
++++++
++++++
++++++
++++++
++++++=
0282726
2525242322
2120191817
161514131211
109876
543210
...
....
 (1) 
 
                                                 
8 LR=2(-15822.074  - (-15958.364) ) = 272.58 on 1 d.f. This is significant at the 5% level of chi2 distribution on 1 
d.f. (3.84). 
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whereEGAij is our measure of entrepreneurial growth aspirations,  
 
{
}ijijij
ijijijijijijijij
FearFailpKnowsEntreBusAngel
EstabBusEducPosttEducSecposntInEmploymeMaleAgeSqAgeCurrEmp
,,
,,,,,,,,  
 
represent individual-level direct effects, 
 
{
}j
jjjjjjjjjj
FearFail
pKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBusEducPosttEducSecposntInEmploymeMaleAgeSqAgeCurrEmp ,,,,,,,,,,  
 
represent individual-level country-year mean effects to control for the effect of individual-
level indicators at a country-year level,  and  
 
jjjjjjj GDPpclGDPgrowthlFDIlFreeCorrlIntelprolExecConstrlGovSizel .,.,.,.,.,.,.  
represent the lagged values of the institutional variables and macroeconomic controls9
ijju ε+0
. Our 
study may be subject to potential endogeneity which may arise because the mean country-year 
individual entry outcome is likely to affect some of the macro variables, for instance GDP 
growth rate. We address this issue by lagging our macroeconomics and institutional variables 
by one year. 
 The combination of represents the random part of the equation, where ju0 are 
the country-year level residuals and ijε are individual-level residuals.  
We note in Table 2potential problems of multicollinearity; intellectual property 
protection and freedom from corruption are correlated with each other and with GDP per 
                                                 
9We also encountered the same problem with outliers in the employment growth expectations variable as Autio 
and Acs (2010) and resolved it in the similar way.  We eliminated 171 individual-level observations based on the 
definition of severe outliers as being outside the outer fence (defined by inter-quartile range multiplied by three). 
We checked the sensitivity of our results to eliminating outliers and found that some of our results do not hold in 
the presence of outliers but our approach is justified by the fact that expectations become very imprecise for 
largest numbers and are beyond a plausible range. 
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capita. Therefore, after running the baseline model as specified by equation 1 above (and 
reported as (1) in Table 4 below), we run two additional models, without intellectual property 
rights and freedom from corruption respectively (models (2) and (3) in Table 4). To assess the 
impact of collinearity with GDP pc, we run two further models (models (4) and (5) in Table 
4), using alternative controls for the level of development; a set of GDP pc dummies denoting 
the five quintiles of its distribution10
We must also consider the  bias related to potential interdependence between the  choice 
of whether to become an entrepreneur and growth aspirations.  In order to tackle this, we need 
to test for selection bias by introducing into the  employment growth aspirations (second 
stage)  equation the inverse Mill’s ratio calculated the equation i the choice to become an  
entrepreneurship (first stage or selection  equation). To identify the first stage of the Heckman 
selection model(Wooldridge 2002), we must find a variable that is correlated with the first 
stage dependent variable (entrepreneurial entry)and  uncorrelated with the second.(growth 
aspirations). For robustness, we utilised two alternative identification strategies.In the first,we 
use a series on start-up entry regulation procedures from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
indicators. Theory suggests thatentrepreneurial entrywill be closely related to start-up entry 
regulation procedures (see e.gDjankovet al 2002) but because they constitute sunk costs, they 
should not be relevant for employment growth expectations.of new firms.   Our alternative 
identification strategy focuses on informal finance. This is a major influence on 
entrepreneurial entry (Bygrave 2003) but is likely to play a less important role in large scale 
projectswhere formal sources of funds will be needed. We therefore introduce the prevalence 
. 
 
 {Tables 2 and 3} 
                                                 
10Similarly, as can be seen in Table 3, two of our mean country-year individual variables, namely ‘knows other 
entrepreneurs’ and ‘owner-manager of established business’ are highly correlated with ‘business angel in past 
three years’ variable. We checked sensitivity of our results by dropping the ‘business angel in past three years’ 
variable aggregated by country-year mean. As a result of this robustness check the significance of social capital 
proxied by ‘knows other entrepreneurs’ aggregated by country-year mean was marginally driven down to 10% 
level of significance in specifications 2-4 (Table 4) whereas it turned out to be insignificant in specification (1). 
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rate of informal investors into the selection equation11
Our empirical results are reported in Table 4. The regressions are highly significant, as 
are all the reported test statistics.  Moreover, the regressions conform to our expectations in the 
sense that the control variables are frequently significant and have the predicted sign. We also 
confirm most of our hypotheses. Commencing with hypothesis 1, we find the coefficient on 
freedom from corruption to be highly significant and with the expected sign in all three 
specifications where it is included. Thus as predicted we find that entrepreneurs in institutional 
environments which are more corrupt have lower employment aspirations.  We also find very 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2a. Our variable, constraints on executive, that we 
use to measure the strength of property rights is entered into all five specifications and is 
always highly significant. The strength of property rights is therefore found to enhance 
employment aspirations of entrepreneurs. The results concerning hypothesis 2b are however 
not consistent with our predictions. We fail to identify a significant impact of the strength of 
intellectual property rights on the employment growth aspirations of entrepreneurs in any of 
the three specifications. Finally, we find strong support for hypothesis 3 in all five 
. We calculated two inverse Mill’s 
ratios, based on each of the above selection equations respectively and included them as a 
control in the second stage equation. However neither werestatistically significant. We 
conclude that there is no selection bias arising from the possibility that the factors determining 
the decision to become an entrepreneur might differ from those determining a new firm’s 
employment growth expectations. Accordingly, we focus attention henceforth solely on the 
employment growth aspirations models. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
                                                 
11These are derived from GEM data by taking the average percentage of respondents who invested in another 
start-up in the past three years in each country-year sub-sample. 
 
25 
 
specifications; the coefficient on the (inverse) size of the government is positive and 
significant in all the equations. 
{Table 4} 
Turning to the control variables, the patterns largely conform to findings elsewhere in 
the literature. As in Bowen and De Clercq (2008), foreign entry has some fragmentary positive 
effects on entrepreneurs’ employment growth expectations though these results are sensitive to 
controlling for corruption. Lower levels of corruption are probably associated with better 
protection of foreign investors and a more competitive business environment in which the 
power of incumbents is weakened to the benefit of entrepreneurs.  
The relationship between age and new firms’ employment growth plans are negative; 
older individuals have lower aspirations. However, the country-year means of age reveal a 
non-linear relationship with employment growth aspirations falling until entrepreneurs reach 
middle age, and rising thereafter.  Higher education and being a male are positively associated 
with growth aspirations, as is previous experience as a business angel. However, being in 
employment has no impact on employment growth aspirations and education has no effect at 
country-year aggregate level, suggesting that while individual effect of education is strong, the 
broader environmental effects are less clear cut. Being the owner of an existing business has a 
negative and highly significant impact on expectations of entrepreneurs to increase 
employment which may be associated with higher risk of reallocating entrepreneurial effort 
away from existing venture. The impact of network capital is significant and positive across all 
specifications. However, its country-year mean effect is sensitive to multicollinearity.   We 
also find that greater risk aversion is likely to discourage planned employment growth. The 
current level of employment, although with the expected negative sign, is insignificant,  
though the subsample average has a significant negative effect, suggesting again the impact of 
competition. Per capita GDP is negatively related to high growth projects, though this finding 
is not consistent across all specifications. When GDP per capita is replaced with a set of 
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quintile dummies, countries which fall within the lowest 20th percentile of GDP per capita are 
found to be more employment growth-oriented, which is consistent with the view that there is 
a wider set of opportunities in developing economies. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our theoretical contribution in this paper has been to explore how the key institutions 
argued by the literature to influence the prevalence of entrepreneurship across countries may 
also affect their employment growth aspirations. We base our work on the ideas of Baumol 
(1990, 1993) and Williamson (2000) as well as the developments by Aidis et al. (2010).  We 
hypothesised that employment growth aspirations will be reduced in institutional environment 
in which corruption is more pervasive; property rights, including intellectual property rights, 
are less clearly defined and enforced; and in which the state plays a greater role in economic 
activity.  
We tested our hypotheses on a large cross-country grouped individual dataset. This 
allowed us to advance the empirical definition of employment growth aspirations by using 
expected increases from current levels of employment over a five year horizon. The dataset 
was structured hierarchically with individuals representing level 1 and country-year samples 
level 2, so we chose to employ multilevel modelling methods in our empirical work.  We also 
verified that the employment growth aspirations of entrepreneurs can be estimated separately 
from the choice to become an entrepreneur by using the Heckman model. 
 We tested a variety of specifications to address issues of multicollinearity, and our results 
were found to be largely robust to these alternatives. We confirmed the first hypothesis and the 
more general version of the second hypothesis (2a), concerning the effects of corruption and of 
property rights correspondingly. We interpret our results as follows. For low-growth aspiration 
ventures or plans to become self-employed, new entrepreneurs can rely on informal 
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institutions and localised trust to build self-efficacy necessary for successful entry. However, 
higher growth aspiration projects require more reliance on formal, impersonal institutions and 
the stability they may offer.  Hence, weak property rights become a binding constraint for 
entrepreneurial development to higher aspiration prospects. Weak protection of property rights 
affect negatively the motivation of entrepreneurs to expand their businesses: they start new 
ventures, but restrict themselves to small, subsistence scale projects. However, it is perhaps 
surprising that we are unable to confirm the impact of strong intellectual property rights on 
employment growth aspirations. One possible explanation is that even for highly innovative 
entrepreneurs who plan to create large scale organisations on the basis of their inventions, the 
overall strength of the property rights system is the key, rather than any single aspect such as 
intellectual property rights. In addition, intellectual property protection perhaps relates more to 
security against private expropriation, which may be counterbalanced to some extent by 
private governance arrangements. In contrast, the risk from arbitrary government is more 
difficult to limit. 
We also confirm the third hypothesis about the role of the state. Our empirical work 
confirms that the scale of the state’s activities affects entrepreneurial growth aspirations 
negatively.  The state may play many important roles in society, but there is a cost in terms of 
entrepreneurial job creation. Interestingly, we find (Table 2) that property rights protection is 
not closely correlated with the size of the government. This implies that the connection 
between the size of the state and weak rule of law as postulated by Hayek (2006 [1960]) 
isproblematic. However, the most important part of Hayek’s legacy relates to the link between 
the constitutional order, political institutional order and economic outcomes. What we have 
demonstrated is that the rule of law is especially important for high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurs. However, property rights need to be disentangled from the issues related to the 
size of the state and the impact of the two needs to be considered separately. In this respect, 
our results are consistent with other research. In particular Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
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argue strongly that political institutions imposing effective constraints on arbitrary action by 
the government are at the core of property rights protection. 
There are some important limitations to our study which one might wish to address in 
subsequent research. While GEM provides the largest cross-country dataset available on 
entrepreneurial activity, the number of countries and especially less developed countries is 
restricted. Moreover, the time horizon of the dataset is still quite short, probably not long 
enough for testing significant institutional development within any one country over time. 
Hence, our hypotheses relate primarily to the impact of variation in institutions, and this 
variation is primarily cross-sectional. To some extent this problem will be addressed by 
undertaking a similar analysis to that presented in this paper when the number of countries and 
years has expanded, especially once GEM includes more low and middle income countries. A 
further limitation is that we have not fully exploited the cross-country individual characteristic 
of the dataset. This is because we sought to focus on how institutions impact differentially on 
entrepreneurial aspirations. Future work should also consider the interaction between 
institutions and individual characteristics, for example the fear of failure or the human capital 
of entrepreneurs. 
Our paper has important implications for would-be entrepreneurs. We have confirmed 
the importance of education, personal networks and youth for entrepreneurs who plan fast 
employment growth. We have also highlighted the problems caused for these aspirations by 
corruption. Individuals aspiring to create larger firms in institutional context where corruption 
is rife need to place developing strategies to address corruption at the top of their agendas. If 
they have the option to move their businesses to environments where corruption is less 
endemic, those options should be exercised.  Similarly the critical role of property rights and 
the rule of law in setting the contexts for successful entrepreneurship must be emphasized. It 
may be that if entrepreneurs are forced to operate in contexts where property rights are weak 
they should lower their aspirations in terms of the growth of the enterprise. It is in such 
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institutional context that we find that those entrepreneurs who failed in their entry are 
particularly less like to try again (Aidis et al, 2008a), therefore a choice of right entry strategy 
becomes essential. 
Our findings also have important implications for policy makers. Considerable evidence 
has been amassed which link innovation, employment, growth and economic development to 
high-aspiration entrepreneurship (Davidsson and Henrekson 2002). Our paper provides 
evidence that entrepreneurship in general can flourish in many contexts, perhaps in part 
because formal institutions such as property rights can be replaced to a greater or lesser extent 
by informal ones like social networks. However, this sanguine view does not apply for high-
growth aspiration entrepreneurship. This is significantly reduced in an environment where 
corruption is high or property rights are poor. We have stressed that formal institutions can be 
improved much more rapidly than informal ones, but significant and sustainable progress in 
the former almost certainly requires as a pre-requisite progress in the latter, consistent with the 
theory framework we adopted. Hence policy-makers in environments where corruption is 
widespread or  property rights are weak need to think deeply about education and other factors 
affecting culture and informal institutions as well, to strengthen them if they wish to encourage 
high employment growth entrepreneurship. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory and variables  
  
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Explanatory variables: business environment & macroeconomic variables 
Constraints on executive 
(t-1) 
Polity IV ‘Executive Constraints’; scores from 1=”unlimited 
authority” to 7=”executive parity”; higher value denotes less 
arbitrariness 
6.56 1.09 
Intellectual property 
rights (t-1) 
Intellectual Property Protection index (Global Competitiveness 
Report); scores from 1=”weak protection” to 7=”strong 
protection” 
5.03 1.23 
Freedom from 
corruption (t-1) 
Heritage Foundation ‘Freedom from Corruption’ index, ranging 
from 0 to 100; higher value denotes less corruption 
67.1 23.2 
Government size, HF (t-
1) 
Heritage Foundation ‘Government size’ index, ranging from 0 to 
100; higher value denotes smaller government 
55.12 23.73 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1) GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, constant at 2000 
$USD (WB WDI 2010) 
24,005    12,278 
GDP growth rate (t-1) Annual GDP growth rate (WB WDI 2010) 3.40 2.56 
FDI/GDP (t-1) FDI stock/GDP (UNCTAD)  37.68 27.64 
Explanatory variables: personal characteristics 
Age The exact age of the respondent between 14 and 99 at time of 
interview 
39 12 
Age squared Age squared - - 
Male 1=male, zero otherwise .61 .49 
Current employment 
level 
Current number of employees + owner-manager  70 4501 
Being in employment 1=respondent is either in full or part time employment, 0 
otherwise 
.92 .27 
Education: Secondary 
&Post-secondary  
1=respondent has a secondary or post-secondary education , 0 
otherwise 
.44 .50 
Education: Post-
secondary 
1=respondent has a post-secondary education .19 .39 
Owner-manager of 
existing business 
1=current owner/manager of business, 0 otherwise .04 .18 
Bus angel in last 3 years 1=business angel in past three years, 0 otherwise .09 .29 
No fear of failure 1=respondent believes that the fear of failure would not prevent 
him/her from starting a business 
.77 .42 
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
1=personally knows entrepreneurs in past two years, zero 
otherwise 
.63 .48 
Dependent variable: 
New firm’s expectations 
of employment growth, 
EGA 
Percentage change in the expected level of employment in 5- yrs’ 
time over the current level of employment by new firms  
.45 .68 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006 unless specified otherwise; the reported statistics are based on the set of observations actually 
used in estimations (13,205) to eliminate the joint effect of missingess in all variables.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for institutional variables 
 
 Constraints on 
executive (t-1) 
Intellectual 
property rights 
(t-1) 
Freedom from 
corruption (t-1) 
Government size, 
HF   (t-1) 
FDI/GDP 
(t-1) 
GDP per 
capita ppp 
(t-1) 
GDP 
growth rate 
(t-1) 
Constraints on 
executive (t-1) 1.00       
Intellectual 
property rights (t-
1) 
.33 1.00      
Freedom from 
corruption (t-1) .35 .87 1.00     
Government size, 
HF (t-1) -.47 -.55 -.61 1.00    
FDI/GDP (t-1) .21 .22 .35 .00 1.00   
GDP per capita 
ppp (t-1) .34 .84 .88 -.52 .32 1.00  
GDP growth rate 
(t-1) -.45 -.42 -.39 .40 .06 -.37 1.00 
 
Source: Polity IV, Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), Heritage Foundation, UNCTAD, World Bank WDI.  
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Table 3: Correlation matrix for country-year means 
 
 Current 
employment 
level 
Age Male Being in 
employment 
Education: 
second or 
postsec 
Education: 
postsecondary 
Owner-
manager of 
exist. bus 
Bus angel in 
last 3 years 
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
No fear of 
failure 
Current 
employment 
level  
1.00       
   
Age  -.006 1.00         
Male -.005 -.51 1.00        
Being in 
employment .039 .027 -.040 1.00    
   
Education: 
second or 
postsec 
.032 .263 -.181 .284 1.00   
   
Education: 
postsecondary -.002 .112 -.212 .372 .529 1.00  
   
Owner-
manager of 
exist. bus 
.036 -.332 .116 .154 -.077 .002 1.00 
   
Bus angel in 
last 3 years .074 -.291 .205 .127 .047 .019 .56 1.00   
Knows other 
entrepreneurs .059 -.430 .336 .181 .021 .070 .45 .65 1.00  
No fear of 
failure .090 .135 -.033 -.166 .174 -.059 -.186 -.001 -.132 1.00 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006. 
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Table 4:  
Estimation results, Multilevel Random Intercept model (specifications 1-5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 EGA EGA EGA EGA EGA 
      
Individual level variables 
Current employment level x10-06 -1.60 -1.60 -1.59 -1.59 -1.60 
 (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) 
Age -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared x10-05 2.03 1.87 1.98 1.98 1.87 
 (2.56) (2.55) (2.56) (2.56) (2.55) 
Male 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.116*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Being in employment 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.024 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Education: second or postsec 0.029* 0.028* 0.029* 0.029* 0.028* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Education: postsecondary 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Owner-manager of exist bus -0.082** -0.078** -0.081** -0.081** -0.078** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Bus angel in last 3 years 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Knows other entrepreneurs 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
No fear of failure 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
Country-year level means 
Current employment level x10-05,  -2.17* -2.25* -2.25* -2.13 -2.15* 
country-year mean (1.26) (1.27) (1.31) (1.33) (1.30) 
Age, country-year mean -0.060* -0.051 -0.063* -0.071** -0.064* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) 
Age squared, country-year mean 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male, country-year mean -0.179 -0.235 -0.261 -0.264 -0.366 
 (0.308) (0.304) (0.322) (0.323) (0.309) 
Being in employment,  0.000 -0.026 0.041 0.050 -0.009 
country-year mean (0.098) (0.098) (0.102) (0.103) (0.101) 
Education: second or postsec,  0.075 0.057 0.075 0.076 0.054 
country-year mean (0.083) (0.083) (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) 
Education: postsecondary,  -0.147 -0.126 -0.136 -0.171 -0.176* 
country-year mean (0.103) (0.102) (0.108) (0.106) (0.103) 
Owner-manager of exist bus,  -0.894*** -0.866** -0.966*** -0.902** -0.769** 
country-year mean (0.340) (0.341) (0.356) (0.359) (0.350) 
Bus angel in last 3 years,  -0.623 -0.462 -0.604 -0.617 -0.490 
country-year mean (0.595) (0.578) (0.629) (0.625) (0.587) 
Knows other entrepreneurs,  0.276* 0.302** 0.334** 0.320** 0.297* 
country-year mean (0.152) (0.151) (0.159) (0.160) (0.156) 
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No fear of failure,  0.127 0.140 0.172 0.173 0.164 
country-year mean (0.129) (0.130) (0.135) (0.140) (0.137) 
 
Table 4. Follow up. 
Variables related to hypotheses 1-3 
Government size, HF (t-1) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constraints on executive (t-1) 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Intellectual property rights (t-1) -0.026 - 0.004 -0.006 - 
 (0.018) - (0.016) (0.018) - 
Freedom from corruption (t-1) 0.004*** 0.003*** - - 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) - - (0.001) 
 
Macroeconomic level control variables 
GDP growth rate (t-1) 0.008** 0.008** 0.007 0.007* 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1) x 10-06 -5.21*** -6.03*** -2.92 - - 
 (1.94) (1.86) (1.92) - - 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1): iq1 - - - 0.060 0.139*** 
 - - - (0.057) (0.053) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):  iq2  - - - 0.009 0.053 
 - - - (0.044) (0.043) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):  iq3 - - - 0.035 0.036 
 - - - (0.044) (0.043) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):  iq4 - - - 0.037 0.036 
 - - - (0.041) (0.040) 
FDI/GDP (t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.223 0.987 1.277 1.400 1.188 
 (0.850) (0.836) (0.887) (0.873) (0.838) 
      
Observations 13,205 13,336 13,205 13,205 13,336 
Number of country-year groups 182 184 182 182 184 
Log Likelihood -13205 -13320 -13212 -13211 -13322 
df 29 28 28 31 31 
      
Random effects parameters      
sigma_u 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
sigma_e 0.655*** 0.654*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.654*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Standard errors in parentheses; p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Figure 1.New businesses’ employment growth expectations: country effects in rank order 
with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006 
 
Note: We calculated the intercepts and confidence intervals using the set of observations without 171 outliers (see 
discussion in section 3.5). We verified however that utilising all observations do not change the results in any 
significant way, apart from Chile overtaking Peru to become one of the two countries (alongside Colombia) with 
highest entrepreneurial aspirations. 
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